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“We are ISIS.”
This was the title of an article written by former Kuwaiti Minister of 
Information, Saad bin Tafla al Ajami, published on 7 August 2014 by 
the Qatari newspaper al Sharq.1
The former Kuwaiti Minister was not celebrating the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), nor the atrocities that it was/is committing 
against civilians and minorities in Iraq and Syria. He was reminding 
his readers that ISIS, while condemned by the majority of Muslims, is 
a product of an Islamic religious discourse that has dominated the 
Muslim public sphere over recent decades — a mainstream discourse!
ISIS “did not come from another planet,” he said. “It is not a product 
of the infidel West or a bygone orient,” he insisted.
No, “the truth that we cannot deny is: ISIS learned from our schools, 
prayed in our mosques, listened to our media... and our religious 
platforms, read from our books and references, and followed Fatwas 
(religious edicts) we produced.”
The former Minister was addressing the role played by some Arab 
Gulf nations in mainstreaming a radical form of Islam, specifically 
Salafism, which provides, among others, the essence of Jihadists’ 
radicalisation religious worldview and narration.
Oddly enough, his message may well contribute to the on-going 
academic debate on the phenomenon of radicalisation and its root 
causes, namely the heated and controversial discussion between the 
two eminent French scholars, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy. How to 
define a phenomenon and its root causes is crucial to understand. 
It has clear ramifications if policymakers of the European Union (EU), 
US and Arab and Islamic countries are to succeed in confronting and 
defeating one of the main security challenges of the 21st century: 
Jihadi radicalisation. This task can prove to be difficult in a highly 
charged political context.
No, “the truth that we cannot deny is: ISIS learned from our schools, 
prayed in our mosques, listened to our media... and our religious 
platforms, read from our books and references, and followed Fatwas 
(religious edicts) we produced.”
1  Quoted in Manea, Elham, “Time to face the ISIS inside of US”, Human Rights Blog, 17 August, 2014, available at: https://
gmablog.org/2014/08/17/time-to-face-the-isis-inside-of-us/.
This chapter will attempt to chart an outline of the main conceptual 
positions on the term radicalisation, Jihadi radicalisation, and its 
drivers and catalysts both on local and global levels. The aim is to 
highlight that while these positions differ, they may, more than often, 
complement each other.
The charged public debate between Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy will serve as 
a main discussion point to the issue. A section will follow with an overview of 
the definitions existing in academic literature and policy papers on the term 
radicalisation and violent radicalisation. The third concluding session will provide 
a definition of Jihadi radicalisation and how scholarly differences in defining 
the phenomenon reflect on the policy measures designed to address it.
Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy - two distinguished French academics 
- do not need an introduction. Both have worked on the broader 
phenomenon of Islamism and offered valuable insights into violent 
radicalisation in Europe. Both have worked within the tradition of 
French sociology on radicalisation, have lists of books to their name, 
and years of on-the-ground experience in the Middle East, Central 
Asia and French suburbs. And both were colleagues and enjoyed 
a friendship over the course of their careers - one that came to an 
abrupt end with a public and messy confrontation.2
At the heart of their differences is a clash of analysis on the drivers and 
catalysts that pave the ground for the radicalisation and recruitment 
of French citizens of migrant background. Simply put, it is whether the 
spat of home-grown violence that gripped France in the last couple 
of years can be attributed to a radicalisation of Islam or an Islamisation 
of radicalisation.
Within their tradition of French sociology, Gilles Kepel and Olivier 
Roy have influenced the study of radicalisation by describing its 
overall cultural and socioeconomic context. Both have identified 
the marginalised dysfunctional French suburbs (banlieues) as the 
pool from which second and third-generation migrants are being 
radicalised. And both in essence agree that radicalisation of these 
youths is a process that seeks to reconstruct a lost identity in a 
perceived hostile and confusing world.3
An Islamisation of Radicalisation  
or the Radicalisation of Islam?
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It is how and in which context this radicalisation takes place that 
seems to set them apart (with an emphasis on the word seems). That 
difference was leaked out of academic circles and publicly argued 
and fought on newspaper platforms.
More than a week after the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) Jihadists 
massacred 130 people in Paris, Roy, who teaches at the European 
University Institute in Florence, Italy, published an op-ed in the 
newspaper Le Monde with the title ‘Jihadism is a generational and 
nihilist revolution’. He argued that the young French Muslims who 
committed this atrocity “did so less because they were Muslim than 
because they were young”. Radicalised French youth recruited by ISIS 
are seeking “a cause, a label, a grand narrative on which to slap the 
blood-stained signature of their personal revolt”. To him the real threat 
to France and the rest of the West is not ISIS, “which will sooner or later 
disappear like a mirage”, it is “the nihilistic and revolutionary reflexes of 
a certain cross-section of alienated youths”. They are rebels seeking a 
cause and, hence, what France and the rest of the West are facing is 
“not the radicalisation of Islam, but the Islamisation of radicalism”.4
Mr. Kepel, a professor at the prestigious Institut d’Etudes Politiques 
de Paris (Sciences-Po), reacted to Roy’s arguments with an article 
published in the newspaper Libération titled “The King Is Naked”, 
playing on the meaning of Roy’s name in French.5
In a strong language, he suggested that Roy first visits the suburbs from 
which these terrorists emerged – which have turned into hothouses 
for Salafism. Roy, Kepel argued, was just echoing the analysis first 
proposed by American specialists who, “knowing neither Arabic nor 
Arabs, declared that these acts of terrorism were the product of 
ruptures with their dominant societies”.6
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2  Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33:9, 2010, p. 799; Adam Nossiter, “That Ignoramus’: Two French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals”, 
New York Times, July 12, 2016. For some of their books see for instance: Kepel, Gilles, Terror in Frankreich, München: Verlag 
Antje Kunstmann, 2016; Kepel, Gilles, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe, Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1997; Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for an New Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
3  Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 799.
4  Roy Olivier, “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste”, Le Monde, 24 November 2015, available at: http://
www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/24/le-djihadisme-une-revolte-generationnelle-et-nihiliste_4815992_3232.
html. Cited in Robert Zaretsky, “Radicalized Islam, or Islamicized Radicalism?”, Chronicle of Higher Education Review, 
May 26 2016.
5  Gilles Kepel, “«Radicalisations» et «islamophobie» : le roi est nu”, Libération, 14 March 2016, available at http://www.
liberation.fr/debats/2016/03/14/radicalisations-et-islamaphobie-le-roi-est-nu_1439535.
6  Robert Zaretsky, ibid; Gilles Kepel, “Le roi est nu”, ibid.
The school represented by Roy sees ISIS militants as no different from 
the members of the Red Brigades in Italy or Red Army Faction in West 
Germany during the 1970s: “The same rebellion, the same rupture, 
the same rupture with violence”.
Kepel considers this to be utter nonsense. To him, the mantra of 
‘radicalisation’ signifies ‘the absence of analysis’. He insists that Roy 
did not “hear the actual words pronounced by Salafist preachers in 
the suburbs, just as he had failed to read the tweets and tracts they 
were broadcasting”. Salafism, Kepel argued, must be taken seriously 
— even if this leads to accusations of ‘Islamophobia’.7
He cites a text, ignored by Roy and his followers, called The Global 
Islamic Resistance Call, which was written by Abu Musab al-Suri, a 
Syrian engineer and one-time functionary of Al-Qaeda who later 
broke with Osama bin Laden, and published in Arabic online in late 
2004 or early 2005. That text offers a glimpse into what he termed in 
his latest book as ‘third-generation jihadism’.8
First-generation Jihadism, which lasted from the 1970s to 1990s, was 
represented by the mujahedin in Afghanistan and the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIS) of Algeria. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation 
represents the second generation of Jihadism, which took over at 
the turn of the millennium. Third-generation Jihadism, introduced 
by al-Suri’s text, changed Al-Qaeda’s model from centrally planned 
attacks against large and symbolic targets to a bottom-up strategy. 
A strategy privileging the actions of independent and isolated 
groups, who are already integrated in the West. The attacks in Paris 
and Brussels might well reflect al-Suri’s destructive influence.9
“If you want to comprehend their functioning, you have to understand 
their background; you have to understand the intellectual resources 
of Salafism”, Kepel commented to a New York Times journalist.10
Mr. Roy responded to the same reporter, scoffing at his colleague’s 
reliance on Al- Suri‘s text: “Nobody is interested in al-Suri”. He added, when 
Mr. Kepel “talks of a ‘third generation in 2005,’ that is false, it is exactly the 
same profile as in the second generation — petty delinquency.” 11
While some argue that the public spat between the two scholars 
reflects in part the confrontational nature of French academia, often 
based on “schools of thought, fuelled by personal or institutional 
animosity”,12 the divergence in positions is hardly unique among those 
researching radicalisation and its violent version.
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Kepel, as it transpired from the previous review, was not exactly a 
fan of the term radicalisation. He called it a mantra that indicates 
an absence of analysis. While his disdain of the concept may not 
be globally shared, many scholars would agree that it has its share 
of critique. Lorenzo Vidino argued in his policy paper on “Jihadist 
Radicalisation in Switzerland” that the term has become extremely 
fashionable in the counter-terrorism community over the last decade. 
Its critics, however, see it as a concept that is “inherently arbitrary, 
lacking a common definition and often simply used to negatively 
connote ideas one does not like”.13
In his conceptual discussion and literature review of the terms 
radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, Alex 
Schmid reminds his readers of the history of the term itself. The term 
“radical” started to be used in the 18th century and was often linked 
to the progressive values of the Enlightenment and the French and 
American revolutions of that period. It became widespread in the 19th 
century and referred to a political agenda advocating for systematic 
social and political reform. Overtime, it also came to signify the 
support for an extreme section of a party.14
JIHADIST RADICALISATION AND THE SEARCH  
FOR A DEFINITION
The term “radical” started to be used in the 18th century and was 
often linked to the progressive values of the Enlightenment and the 
French and American revolutions of that period... Overtime, it also 
came to signify the support for an extreme section of a party.14
7  Robert Zaretsky, ibid; Gilles Kepel, ibid. 
8  Kepel, Gilles “Terror in Frankreich”, p.11-15. The Arabic text of al-Suri can easily be found on the internet.
9  Gilles Kepel, ibid; Robert Zaretsky, ibid.
10  Adam Nossiter, ibid.
11  Ibid.
12  Robert Zaretsky, ibid.
13  Lorenzo Vidino, “Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland”, Center for Security Studies, Zurich: ETH, 2013, p.11.
14  Alex Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review”, 
ICCT Research, The Hague, March 2013, p. 6.
In other words, the term radicalisation changes overtime. It is a 
relative term. In the early 20th century, those who supported the 
Suffragette movement – giving women the right to vote - were called 
radicals. By the same token, what is considered radical in one culture 
may be considered moderate or even mainstream in another.15
The history of political ideas on the concept ‘radicalism’, Schmid 
argues, points to a definition of two main elements reflecting thought/
attitude and action/behaviour, respectively:16
❯  “Advocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction 
that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a 
fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to 
the radical;
❯  The means advocated to bring about the system-transforming, 
radical solution for government and society can be non-violent 
and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and 
non-democratic (through coercion and revolution).
”Vidino insists that radicalisation, despite its shortcomings as a term, 
is useful to describe the dynamics related to the field of political 
violence. He identifies the definition of Charles E. Allen, which he 
describes as one of the most complete definitions, as it encapsulates 
many elements used by most scholars. Hence, radicalisation is 
‘‘the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the 
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to 
effect societal change.’’17
Accordingly, scholars often distinguish two types of radicalisation:18
❯  Cognitive radicalisation: defined as the process through which 
an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those 
of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social 
order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a 
belief system that is completely different.
❯  Violent radicalisation: occurs when an individual takes the 
additional step of employing violence to further the views 
derived from cognitive radicalism.
When radicalisation is connected to violent extremism, Randy 
Borum argues that the limited professional literature available has 
mainly focused on the question of why (and, to a lesser extent, how) 
– “someone comes to adopt beliefs and behaviours that support his 
or her engagement in subversive and terrorist activities, particularly 
violence toward civilian non-combatants”.19
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Since 1960, academic research on the issue has sought the answer 
by investigating terrorist activity at different levels: individual, group, 
network, organisation, mass movement, socio-cultural context, and 
international/inter-state contexts. While 40 years of research have 
debunked the idea that only ‘crazy’ people engage in terrorism, most 
contemporary social scientists look at radicalisation and its violent 
outcome as a dynamic process. The nature of that process, however, 
remains poorly understood.20
Dalgaard-Nielsen looked at radicalisation in its connection to militant 
Islamism. She defines militant Islamism as a narrative of victimhood. 
It “claims that Islam and Muslims are constantly attacked and 
humiliated by the West, Israel, and corrupt local regimes in Muslim 
countries”. In order to return to a “society of peace, harmony, and 
social justice”, this narrative calls on Muslims “to stand up for their 
faith”. Violence, including violence against civilians, is religiously 
sanctioned and brings the fighter closer to God.21
Dalgaard-Nielsen moves to identify two theoretical frameworks used 
in researching this dimension. First, the French Sociology School, 
which argues that there is neither a single explanation of violent 
radicalisation, nor one single profile of radicals in Europe. It offers 
classical sociological factors – e.g. socio-economic marginalisation, 
lack of education, neighbourhood solidarity and peer pressure – to 
explain radicalisation not only of individuals from Europe’s lower social 
strata, but also of members of a well-off, apparently well-integrated 
Muslim middle class in Europe. This concerns individuals with no 
apparent lack of education, job opportunities, or resources to engage 
in constitutional politics.
The key contention of this group of sociologists is that “violent 
radicalisation arises out of the particular challenges faced by an 
increasingly Westernised generation of young Muslims in Europe, who 
attempt to carve out an identity for themselves”.22
29
15  Lorenzo Vidino, ibid.
16  Alex Schmid, p. 8.
17  Lorenzo Vidino, pp.11-12.
18  Ibid.
19  Borum, Randy, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories”, Journal of Strategic Security, 
Article 2, Volume 4, Issue 4, Winter 2011, p. 14-15.
20  Ibid.
21  Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 798.
22  Ibid, p. 800.
While both Roy and Kepel belong to this school of thought, they came 
to clash, as explained in the prior session, on the role of religious 
ideology in the radicalisation process of youths.
Second, the Social Movement Theory and Network Theory, which focus 
on the specifics of recruitment and processes of violent radicalisation. 
Scholars such as Quintan Wiktorowicz and Marc Sageman argue 
that “violent radicalisation is about who you know—radical ideas 
are transmitted by social networks and violent radicalisation takes 
place within smaller groups, where bonding, peer pressure, and 
indoctrination gradually changes the individual’s view of the world”.23
In other words, as Wiktorowicz’s research indicates, grievances and 
discontent do not automatically lead to action, or outright violent 
actions, for that matter. Instead, radicalisation is a social process that 
results from interaction with and within a radical group—a process 
by which the individual is gradually convinced that the perceived 
injustices require the individual to engage personally, and that violence 
is religiously sanctioned.24
These approaches and definitions look at specific dimensions of 
violent radicalisation in connection to militant Islamism. They agree 
that it is a process of some sort and try to understand what motivates 
an individual to engage in violent acts, but there is little consensus or 
clarity about how and when this takes place.
Acknowledging this divergence of opinions, the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, 
constructed a framework for understanding radicalisation, based on 
“three overlapping but distinct elements that motivate individuals to 
becoming radicalised or committing terrorist acts”.25 These are:
❯  The ideas of the radical narrative that provide a filter for 
understanding the world;
❯  The sociological factors that compel an individual to embrace 
this radical narrative; and
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These approaches and definitions look at specific dimensions  
of violent radicalisation in connection to militant Islamism. They agree 
that it is a process of some sort and try to understand what motivates  
an individual to engage in violent acts, but there is little consensus  
or clarity about how and when this takes place.
❯  The psychological factors, characteristics, pathologies, and 
triggers that may prompt an individual to use violence in order 
to promote or consummate this narrative.26
Psychologists and behavioural scientists at the Joint Military 
Information Support Center (JMISC) introduced a broader model. 
They surveyed existing conceptual models of radicalisation and 
associated empirical research and then presented their own model 
– one that highlighted the major components of the radicalisation 
process that different models appeared to have in common. The 
model identified the following, seven interacting components:27
❯  Motivations: Motivations may or may not be the ultimate 
why of violent activity. In this model, they function as an initial 
impetus. Motivations are composed of both push factors, such 
as grievances, and pull factors, which may serve as instrumental 
(e.g. money) or expressive (e.g. perceived importance) incentives.
❯  Socially-facilitated Entry: Introduction to extremist ideas and 
to an extremist collective occur through family, kinship networks 
or social institutions (schools, religious training centres, prisons).
❯  Splintering/Progression: Becoming a violent extremist is 
typically not an abrupt, one-time decision, but one that 
occurs incrementally over time. It should be seen as a gradual 
escalation, or as a series of discrete actions or decisions that 
prime an individual for what should occur at the next level.
❯  Intensification: This is a group-based framework. It explains an 
individual’s increase in extremism and deepening of commitment 
by in-group socialisation. Influence by a group leader and 
dynamics among its members shape an individual’s thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours toward those of the group, and nurture 
intolerance for those outside the group.
❯  Ideology: The role of ideology spurs heated discussions. At its 
core is a narrative that follows some forms of a script about 
something that is wrong/not right and some person or entity to 
be blamed for it.
31
23  Ibid, p. 801.
24  Ibid, 803.
25  Borum, Randy (Winter 2011), “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: Conceptual Models and Empirical Research”, 
Journal of Strategic Security, Article 3, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp. 43-44.
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid, pp.44-45.
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The previous review has shown that, while scholars differ in their 
definitions of the terms radicalisation and violent radicalisation, most 
agree that the two refer to a process.
T. Stevens and P. Neuman sum up these definitions by saying:29
“ Most of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalisation 
as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come 
to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for 
political aims. Some authors refer to ‘violent radicalisation’ in order 
to emphasise the violent outcome, and distinguish the process 
from non-violent forms of ‘radical’ thinking.”
This paper’s author agrees with the previous summary, defining 
radicalisation as a gradual process involving individuals or/and 
groups, which lead to an indoctrination into extreme ideas. It sees 
this process as a spectrum, in which resorting to violence is its last 
stage. Because the readiness to use violence is often experienced at 
the end point of that spectrum, an inherent component of this process 
is a cognitive radicalisation and indoctrination shaped by narratives 
propagated of radical forms of Islam, specifically Salafi Islam. Jihadi 
Islamism is, hence, defined as the violent form of radicalisation 
motivated and shaped by the narration of militant Salafism.
Jihadi radicalisation and implications for policymakers
❯  Threat/Defence: An out-group threat is a key factor binding the 
in-group together (key element of the narrative) and it suggests 
that violence is necessary to defend the cause or the in-group, 
and rationalises offensive action as ‘defensive’.
❯  Belonging/Identity: This element recognises that people 
sometimes are drawn to violent extremist ideologies and 
groups because they feel a need for belonging.This model uses 
a working definition of violent radicalisation drawing from the 
work of McCauley and Moskalenko, which views radicalisation as 
an “increased preparation for, and commitment to, intergroup 
conflict and violence… driven by changes in beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviours in directions that increasingly justify inter-group 
violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in-group”.28
Salafism is an orthodox Sunni movement, which emerged in the 1300s 
and was later revived in a distinct form in the 18th century, especially 
in Najd (a region in today’s Saudi Arabia) by founder of the Wahhabi 
movement Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It advocates the strict 
practice of and absolute obedience to Islam as decreed (according 
to their interpretation) by the Prophet and the early generations of 
his followers. These are known as the Salaf, or the forefathers – hence 
the adjective Salafi. It rejects any form of mediation between God 
and the individual believer, and it strictly forbids the use of shrines or 
sculptures – a position that often led to their destruction wherever the 
Salafis came to power. It takes an intolerant fundamentalist stance 
towards non-Muslims and non-Salafis, and it obliges Muslims to 
distance themselves from them. It considers it an obligation of Muslims 
to respond to the call for holy war/Jihad and defines the conditions for 
such a response.30
Quintan Wiktorowicz, an expert on Salafism mentioned previously, 
differentiates between three strands of Salafism.31 The purists 
emphasise a focus on non-violent methods of propagation, purification 
and education. The politicos emphasise the application of the Salafi 
creed to the political arena, whereby the Jihadists take a militant position 
and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution.
All of these three strands of Salafism, Wiktorowicz reminds us, share 
a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary 
world and, hence, propose different solutions. The splits, accordingly, 
are about contextual analysis, not belief.
33
All of these three strands of Salafism, Wiktorowicz reminds us, share 
a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary 
world and, hence, propose different solutions. The splits, accordingly, 
are about contextual analysis, not belief.
28  Ibid.
29  Stevens, T. and Neuman, P., “Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action,” International Centre 
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2009, p. 10.
30  Elham Manea (2005), “Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia”, Oman, Yemen (London: Saqi), p. 20–22, 
73–74; for more informtion on Salifism and the principle of al-wala’ wa-lbara, see: Said, Benham T. and Fouad, 
Hazim (eds) (2014), “Salafismus: Auf der suche nach der wahren Islam” (Freiburg: Herder Verlag), p. 64–74; 
Brown, Jonathan (2011), Salafis and Sufis in Egypt, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
31  Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2006), “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, N. 29, London: 
Routledge, p. 208.
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32  Hakimiyya is defined as the exclusive prerogative of God to fashion principles appropriate to the proper functioning of 
a social, political and economic order; God is the legal sovereign as well as the Lord of nature, see Qutb, Sayyid (1978), 
Milestones, Beirut: The Holy Koran House, p. 16 – 140; Calvert, John, “Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism”, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 224 – 225.
33  Ayman-al-Zawahiri, “Knights under the Prophets Banner in Arabic”, Forum of Tawheed and Jihad, first edition, p. 14.
34  Abu Musab al-Suri, “The Global Islamic Resistance Call” in Arabic, p174.
35  Robert Zaretsky, ibid.
That said, the Jihadist form of Salafism is as much shaped by the 
teachings of Salafi religious scholars as by radical writers of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. For example, Ayman-al-Zawahiri refers in his 
book Knights under the Prophets Banner to Sayyid Qutb’s concept of 
Hakimiyya32 as the “real spark of the Islamic revolution against the 
enemies of Islam inside and outside Islamic countries”.33 Similarly, the 
book of Al-Suri mentions Qutb, his trial and execution as part of the 
Islamic revolutionary struggle against the enemies of Islam.34
This brings us back to the significance of the ‘Kepel vs. Roy’ clash. 
Many observers, including this author, consider the clash overly 
exaggerated. In fact, the two complement each other.35 Roy would 
like policymakers to focus on the behaviour and psychology of the 
Jihadists who committed these atrocities – i.e. individuals alienated by 
their society. Kepel, while not at all disputing the alienation dimension, 
wants to expand the focus and look at the ideological/religious roots 
that radicalise these youths– namely, Salafism and its religious 
structures and tools. To him, the atrocities committed in France and 
Belgium are an expression of an Islamist radicalisation that took shape 
over decades, festering on segregation and lack of integration. In 
other words, Roy would like to focus on the individual and local drivers, 
whereas Kepel would like to expand our scrutiny of a global factor – the 
transnational Jihadi Islamism that feeds on these local drivers. Roy’s 
position provides a politically correct way to discuss a delicate issue, 
while Kepel would like to get to the bottom of it, even if that would 
offend the sensitivity of some Western liberal and leftist academics.
Interestingly, if not ironically, the assessment of the former Kuwaiti 
Minister of Information, Saad bin Tafla al Ajami, appears to support 
Kepel’s position. When he reminded his readers of Gulf monarchies’ 
mainstreaming of Salafi Islam, he was in fact stating quite clearly that 
their political survival tactics led to none other than a radicalisation of 
Islam
